Article

EUROPEAN URBAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES

European Urban and Regional Studies
2016, Vol. 23(2) 136–148
© The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0969776413502659
eur.sagepub.com

'That neighbourhood is an ethnic bomb!' The emergence of an urban governance apparatus in Western Europe

Giovanni Picker
Higher School of Economics, Russia

Abstract

In this article I investigate ethnographically the urban governance of Rancitelli, a marginalized neighbourhood in Pescara, Southern Italy; in the neighbourhood the majority of the members of the local unrecognized minority of Italian Roma reside. Although privately recognizing social problems concerning the neighbourhood and its residents, who live in marginal social conditions, local authorities are silent vis-à-vis these issues. Drawing on long-term fieldwork and analysis of local media and policy texts, I show that in the absence of local authorities' official discourses on Roma and the neighbourhood, social order is continually maintained through an unofficial complex dynamic, which I call 'urban governance apparatus'. I show that this 'apparatus' is composed of three elements, namely (1) public policy in the neighbourhood; (2) urban Roma stigma; and (3) what I call 'surreptitious gazing' in the neighbourhood. My argument is that when urban governance involves major tacit and unofficial dynamics – and this is especially true when unrecognized minorities are involved – the concept of 'urban governance apparatus' may better serve the aim of analysing and understanding certain local power dynamics.

Keywords

urban governance apparatus, unrecognized minorities, Roma, Pescara, Italy, Ethnography

Introduction

Studies on the post-1970s urban governance of social marginality in European cities can be divided in three main streams, according to the citizenship status of the governed. Firstly, studies of immigrants not holding the same citizenship status of the majority (e.g. Allen and Cars, 2001; Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009; Picker, 2011; Vaiou and Stratigaki, 2008); secondly, studies of second- or third-generation migrants holding the same citizenship status of the majority (e.g. Amin, 2002; Theodore and Peck, 2012; Uitermark and Duyendak, 2008); thirdly, and comparatively less intensively, studies of recognized national or ethnic minorities holding the same citizenship status of the majority (e.g. Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2001; Picker, 2013; Simon, 2002; Van der Horst and Ouwehand, 2012). However, Europe is inhabited by groups that do not fall into any of those three categories, but, which, nevertheless, are subject to state practices and discourses that are ethnically and racially conditioned. They are the so-called 'unrecognized minorities' (Council of Europe, 1992), namely groups that have been living

Corresponding author:
Giovanni Picker, Centre for Advanced Studies, Faculty of Sociology, Higher School of Economics, K. 421, 3, Kochnovski proezd, Moscow 125319, Russia.
Email: gpicker@hse.ru

for centuries within national borders, in relation to which the majority society widely acknowledges cultural difference, yet that do not enjoy minority rights. While much has been written on urban governance of migrants and national minorities, urban scholars seem to have paid less attention to the ways in which unrecognized minorities are locally turned into subjects of governance.[1]

In this article I focus on a periphery neighbourhood of Pescara in which Italian Roma live, as an instance of urban governance of unrecognized minorities. One of the major harbours of the Adriatic Sea, Pescara lies on the same longitude as Rome and has a population of 123,000. Italian Romani Pescarians number about 1,000, meaning less than 1% of the population, and the majority of them reside in Rancitelli. In the mid-1950s they arrived in Pescara from nearby towns and villages and at the end of the 1970s 40 families were allocated newly built social housing in Rancitelli (Manna, 1996: 55–56). Today Rancitelli Romani families live in a condition of diffused social marginality; of a total of 93 Romani children between the ages of six and ten years old, only 44 attend primary school; of a total of 87 Romani boys and girls aged 11–14, only one attends secondary school, and of 54 Romani teenagers (aged 15–19) in the neighbourhood, only 31 attend high school (Guarnieri and Dicati, 2005: 25). In this context, I am here interested in the question about the ways in which social order is maintained in the neighbourhood. Unlike the case of recognized minorities and migrants, urban governance of unrecognized minorities is not official, but subtle and predicated upon unofficial power relations.[2] This has important implications for recent debates on urban governance.

In the first section I will situate my study among these debates, theoretically discussing the concept of urban governance apparatus; in the second and third sections I will outline the historical formation of that apparatus in Rancitelli; in the fourth section I will discuss local politicians' representations of Rancitelli and of local Roma and media discourse, and in the fourth and fifth sections I will focus on everyday forms of stigma and control in the neighbourhood and outside its perimeter. My argument is that when urban governance involves major tacit and unofficial dynamics – and this is especially true when unrecognized minorities are involved – the concept of 'urban governance apparatus' may better serve the aim of analysing and understanding precise local power dynamics. Between August 2008 and July 2011 I intermittently conducted fieldwork in the city, carrying out participant observation in the neighbourhood and beyond; 27 open-ended semi-structured interviews with local politicians, civil servants and social workers, and media analysis focusing on the three most widely read local newspapers.[3]

Towards an 'urban governance apparatus'

After the 1970s global change from social to market-led entrepreneurial forms (Harvey, 1979), and past the 1980s and early 1990s downward rescaling of state powers (Brenner, 2004; Jessop, 2002), urban governance over the last 20 years seems to have gained conventional agreement. A mainstream conceptualization of governance in Europe combines three main elements, namely (1) coalitions of local authorities and private actors, such as private experts and other social groups, as the main drivers of governance; (2) the temporary and ad hoc character of their actions; and (3) the collective and relatively non-hierarchical setting of goals (Bagnasco and Le Galès, 2001: 26; Giersig, 2008; Imrie and Rako, 1999; Le Galès, 2002). These three elements are at the core of local regulatory mechanisms that, although soft, fragmented and not always tightly coordinated, have social cohesion and development as two of their main goals. Further discussions have given analytical importance to situating processes of urban governance within the local context acknowledging that 'governance is of course an ideal type, of which only variations exist in reality' (Vranken, 2008: 34). Some of the most significant factors influencing the working of urban governance are local socio-political regimes (Seixas and Albet i Mas, 2010); national political and fiscal regimes (Leach, 1996); and previous and current urban policies (Imrie and Raco, 1999).

However, there are two major lines of criticism of urban governance. The first, which could be

named 'contextual', suggests that urban governance cannot properly account for regulatory mechanisms in certain contexts, for instance in Southern Italy with regards to the participation of local social groups (Governa, 2010: 674–675) and in the UK concerning the lack of a strong hierarchical organization (Davies, 2002). The second, which could be called 'epistemic', indicates a tendency in recent studies of urban governance towards understanding economic success as synonymous with overall successful governance. This is described as a 'New Conventional Wisdom' (Buck et al., 2005), and, since it is not easy to find empirical basis for its claims, it is advised that 'in a local scale it would be more appropriate to revert to consider the (very real) social and personal impacts of inequality, disconnection and disorder rather than being diverted by New Conventional Wisdom arguments into focusing on hypothetical economic effects' (Buck et al., 2005: 281).

Both advocates and critiques of urban governance accept that urban governance is a multifarious dynamic happening in the formal realm of urban politics and society. By contrast this article shows that it is necessary to look at the specific forces and dynamics that produce social order *beyond* the official and public realm of urban life. Indeed, Pescara authorities have never constructed an official discourse on Rancitelli Roma, let alone on Roma altogether. In order to account for this tacit type of governance, one of the possible theoretical conceptualizations of urban governance is Osbourne and Rose's (1999) designation of a process of 'reduction in the scope of direct management of human affairs by state-organized programmed and technologies of relation, and an increase in the extent to which the government of diverse *domains* is enacted by the decisions and choices of relatively autonomous *entities* […]' (Osbourne and Rose, 1999: 751; emphasis added). As I will discuss in this article, the 'domain' upon which governance in Rancitelli is enacted is social deviance, and the 'entities' enacting it are not only social actors and institutions, but also deep-rooted and 'relatively autonomous' processes of stigmatization and control, which work through Foucauldian 'technologies' for the sake of identification and control.

Stigmatization is the essential background against which the urban governance of Rancitelli works, and it has two main declinations. First, the stigmatization of Pescarian Roma that, following Goffman (1963), can be called 'tribal stigma of race, nation and religion' (Goffman, 1963: 4), namely 'expectations regarding individual behavior and evaluations of a person's moral worth are extrapolated from impressions of the larger group to which the individual belongs' (Adams, 2003: 3); this is what I will in particular discuss in the section *urban Roma stigma*. Second is the stigmatization of Rancitelli that, following Wacquant (2007), can be called 'territorial stigma'. Territorial stigma is close to Goffman's 'tribal stigma' insofar as it is usually hereditary, but, unlike the Goffmanian category, 'it can be quite easily dissimulated […] through geographic mobility' (Wacquant, 2007: 215). In the case of Rancitelli residents, however, geographic mobility is almost absent, and therefore, the two sides of stigmatization happen almost simultaneously. This is what I will discuss in the next section and in the sections *Urban II: public policy in the neighbourhood, Local politicians' representations* and *Local media discourse: a striking symbiosis*.

In line with Osbourne and Rose's (1999) conceptualization of urban governance, I will argue that, due to the lack of an official discourse and policy explicitly addressing Roma, the classic notion of governance cannot fully grasp the subtleties continually imposing social order in Rancitelli. As an alternative, I put forward the concept of 'urban governance apparatus' defining it, with Paul Rabinow, as a heterogeneous 'device targeting the members of a population that is constituted by a disparate set of 'technologies', which work by '*first specifying* (and to that extent creating) those targets [i.e. the members of that population] and then *controlling* (distributing and regulating) them' (Rabinow, 2003: 50–51; emphasis added). It is heterogeneous inasmuch as it consists of 'discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, *the said as much as the unsaid*' (Foucault, 1980: 194; emphasis added). Accordingly, the 'technologies' of the 'urban

governance apparatus' in Rancitelli are six, namely (1) one European Union (EU)-funded public policy in Rancitelli; (2) urban Roma stigma in Pescara at large; and (3) surreptitious gazing in Rancitelli; the three social phenomena are (a) police enforcement in the neighbourhood; (b) local politicians' representations of Rancitelli and of Roma; and (c) local media discourse on Rancitelli and on Roma.

As I will demonstrate in the article, all six 'technologies' serve the apparatus' twofold function of '*specifying* (and to that extent creating) those targets [i.e. Roma] and then *controlling* (distributing and regulating) them'. However, since Roma in Pescara do not have an institutional voice, primarily because they lack the minority status, the process of *specifying* who is and who is not Roma occurs more explicitly in the context of the only public policy – and in particular, in one policy text, of local authorities' representations of Roma and Rancitelli – in order to identify whether institutional power could bring any change to the current marginalization of Roma, and of local media discourse – defining who Rancitelli Roma are. Therefore, while police enforcement in the neighbourhood (a) and surreptitious gazing (3) have a more '*controlling*' function, the EU-funded public policy (1); local politicians' representations (b); local media discourse (c); and urban Roma stigma (2) have a more '*specifying*' function.

Neoliberal measures and the making of territorial stigma

The origins of the 'urban governance apparatus' in Rancitelli are to be found in the last 35 years of neoliberal measures, including social and administrative services withdrawal alongside police enforcement, leading to the formation of a twofold stigma, that is, the 'decay stigma' and the 'Roma stigma'. From 1976 to 1980, district councils (*consigli di quartiere*) functioned as the main political assemblies at the neighbourhood level.[4] Members were selected by municipal elites, and served as the main interface between Rancitelli inhabitants and the local council for problems ranging from infrastructural to social issues. However, in the mid-1980s councils were dismantled due to the excessive expense for the local council. This abrupt end of civic participation created the conditions under which 'territorial stigma' became rooted in everyday life. A 1988 journalistic inquiry described how the neighbourhood was perceived:

> 'Risk neighbourhood' (*quartiere a rischio*). This is the way Pescarians call the areas where Gypsies found abode [i.e. primarily Rancitelli]. The more Roma who arrived, the higher the tensions became in the neighbourhood. In a couple of streets, which were anyway already disreputable, the presence of Gypsies gave rise to some clash. (Villoresi, 1988)

In 1992 this twofold stigma intensified, as 40 Romani families fleeing Yugoslavia's fragmentation found precarious and improvised shelter in Rancitelli. In 1995 the mayor ordered their eviction (Molinari and Sabatini, 1996), and the local council shut down its services in Rancitelli, including a primary school, the National Pension System front office (INPS), the municipal Registry Office and the Chamber of Commerce (*Pescara Vicina*, 2005: 21). Soon after, a building hosting a secondary school and a day nursery was converted into a *Carabinieri* barrack.[5]

'Decay' progressively became the idiom for describing Rancitelli. From 1998 the municipal council shut down other welfare offices in the neighbourhood, moving them to other districts. The community policeman (*poliziotto di quartiere*), a traditionally friendly security figure close to the local community, was removed along with other public front offices. In July 2002, the municipality ceased financing the major local Romani association, which could not go on with its activities.[6] In 2008 the six municipal districts were merged into three circumscriptions, and all the public offices, which had remained in Rancitelli, were moved to the circumscription's headquarters about two kilometres away from Rancitelli. In order to understand the general meaning of Rancitelli's 'decay' stigma, it is meaningful to consider the findings of a survey carried out in 2004 by a group of Rancitelli residents in the neighbourhood:

> Rancitelli residents complain about the absence of community life and about the lack of services at various levels, such as street lighting, signposting, general lack of cleanliness, and inadequate public transport. The amount of police forces are considered to be scarce. Relationships with Gypsy residents (*zingari residenti*) are difficult. Further problems are: youth unrest, the presence of asbestos in several buildings; acoustic and air pollution, which are also provoked by the presence of the nearby airport; and finally, the lack of green areas. (Pescara Vicina, 2004: 21)

This excerpt clarifies the everyday meaning of 'decay' (*degrado*) and its tight links to 'Gypsies'. The 'territorial stigma' of 'decay' does not only refer to material deprivation; rather, it has to do with a more comprehensive dysfunction of human and institutional mechanisms of caring about the neighbourhood. In order to tackle Rancitelli's *degrado*, from 2000 to 2006 the local council implemented the first, and to date the only, public policy in the neighbourhood. This is the urban governance apparatus' first technology, which I am now going to discuss.

Urban II: public policy in the neighbourhood

In 2000 Pescara was among the cities that passed the selection for the EU Urban II tender, an EU-funded rehabilitation programme involving 70 marginal urban areas in Europe, [7] one of which was Rancitelli. In Pescara the programme was entirely managed by the local council, and it is crucial to focus on the programme, because it account for the only policy texts that account for the municipality's views about Rancitelli Roma. With the final aim of tackling infrastructural underdevelopment and social distress, the municipality used the 'territorial stigma' of 'decay' as the main conceptual standpoint, attaching two meanings to it. The first meaning was 'physical decay' (*degrado fisico*), relating to 'abandoned industrial areas and isolation of socially disadvantaged groups'; and the second meaning was 'urban decay' (*degrado urbanistico*), pertaining to 'bad housing conditions and vandalism by marginalised social strata, the members of which have problems in living together' (Città di Pescara, 2006). While the first meaning is clearly related to material bad conditions, the second one underlines socially deviant behaviours and directly relates them to marginality.

This is also evident in the programme section on 'social distress' (*disagio sociale*), in which Rancitelli's socially vulnerable groups are listed, including 'immigrants, old persons, people on social benefits, *high number of Romani communities* (sic) with serious social integration problems, minor aged persons in danger, and criminal subjects'. 'Romani communities' are described thus:

> The Romani community's condition of social distress is linked to Roma's strong attachment to certain *ethno-cultural traditions*, such as strong identity feeling; nomadism, and the centrality of extended family. These traditions badly match with the lifestyle that this community was forced to adjust to. In addition, living together with the local population proved difficult, due partly to reciprocal hostility, and partly to the lack of trust vis-à-vis Roma, that is caused by Roma's recurrent illegal behaviours. (Città di Pescara, 2006: 5; emphasis added)

In the quoted excerpt, Roma are depicted as responsible for their own 'social distress'. This implies that if there are social integration problems between Roma and non-Roma in Rancitelli, the document seems to suggest the main reason is linked to Roma people's 'ethno-cultural traditions' and 'illegal practices'. However, while the ill-fit of 'ethno-cultural traditions' is explained as a consequence of the fact that Roma have had to adjust to the majority society's lifestyle, Roma's illegal behaviours are left unexplained. These behaviours are described only as the reason for the lack of trust by the majority vis-à-vis Roma. Roma therefore are not only exclusively viewed as others 'ethno-culturally' and fundamentally deviant socially, but they are also considered as responsible for the lack of trust vis-à-vis themselves. In line with this representation, from 2002 to 2007 the budget that was allocated to the only measure promoting ethnic minorities' integration – that is, measure 3.2 concerning only Roma – was drastically reduced from 250,000 Euros in 2002 (Città di Pescara, 2002: 5), to 80,000 Euros in July 2007 (Città di Pescara 2007: 6), effectively amounting, in September 2007, to only 51,000 Euros (Comune di Pescara, 2007: 16).

Urban II's very scarce results are summarized by Anna, a Rancitelli social worker that I interviewed in 2008:

> … we set up this front office in this community centre, in order to welcome people living in all sorts of 'social distress'. They [Urban II managers] created this very beautiful structure, but never advertised it to the local population. Nobody knows it, and it's already three years that it's been open!

Anna's words indicated a general lack of effort by Urban II managers towards social integration, privileging instead infrastructural issues. With regard to Urban II programmes in Italian cities, Mingione and Nuvolati (2003) pointed out that 'notwithstanding its novelty and positive impact on local administrators' competences, Urban II did not sufficiently help the real re-qualification of the cities in *social terms* but in *infrastructural* terms' (Mingione and Nuvolati, 2003: 116; emphasis added). In sum, being the only official document revealing the municipality's views on Rancitelli Roma, and considering its very scarce results in terms of social integration, Urban II contributed to what can be seen more as a *specifying* technology, rather than having a *controlling* function.

Police enforcement in the neighbourhood

Against the background of the quite unsuccessful Urban II project, police enforcement in the neighbourhood stems as a relatively more effective technology, serving the function of *control* over Rancitelli and its Romani population. From 2005 to 2011, 320 police raids per year were carried out in Rancitelli, namely one per day, excluding Sundays;[8] this intensive wave of state repression culminated in 2011, as the municipal assembly passed an ordinance imposing the presence of 30 National Army soldiers in the neighbourhood (*Il Pescara*, 2011), showing similarities with militarized marginalized neighbourhoods across the world (Maneri, 2010: 85–92; Wacquant, 2008). Within this context, in summer 2011 I interviewed Adriano, the chief police officer in charge of urban peripheries, who explained to me that the main problem in Rancitelli was the presence of drugs, and that Roma were involved in the drug market:

> They [Roma] have a no-work culture [*cultura del non lavoro*]. They are Pescarians now, but they do not ask for integration. Many of them do not send children to school. The average Pescarian is prone to social integration, but the… they are not. A large number of those living in Rancitelli do not want to integrate, and think that they are the boss there [in Rancitelli].

He was pessimistic about the possibility of Roma's social integration, and confided to me that 'If they do not want to step back into legality, by sending children to school, no solution [i.e. social integration] will be possible'. And speaking of Roma's neighbours, he told me that 'For the good Rancitelli residents [*residenti per bene*] there are big problems, such as the very high volume of music played in cars. For them, living together with Roma is in general very difficult'. I asked him, what the police's main strategy to cope with this was, and he replied that 'Since the problem is their [Roma's] no-work culture, the only thing we can do is a *containment action* [*azione di contenimento*], by constantly patrolling the neighbourhood's streets and periodically intervening with raids'.

My encounter with Adriano highlights three main issues. Firstly, in police representations Rancitelli almost equals 'Roma', as Adriano's first statement about Rancitelli immediately referred to Roma; secondly, the main strategy of police action in Rancitelli is containment, since social problems in the neighbourhood derive, according to Adriano, exclusively from an unchangeable factor, meaning Roma's 'no-work culture'; finally, deviance is the pivotal dimensions within which the police view Rancitelli Roma. Adriano's representations of Rancitelli and of Roma directly relate to the next two technologies, namely local politicians' representations and local media discourse.

Local politicians' representations

Local politicians' representations of Rancitelli and of the relationships between Romani and non-Romani Pescarians further account for the same process of

attributing to the Roma the main responsibility for social disorder that was explicit in the Urban II project. This was the view of Rancitelli that most of the local politicians I interviewed shared:

> In that area [Rancitelli] there is a high concentration of Roma, and we know that when there is a high concentration of a different ethnie [*etnia*], difficult situations occur. In the case of the relationships between Pescarians and Roma (sic), the situation becomes ever more difficult because today they [Roma] are not recognised by the Pescarian citizenry.

This was the most widespread view of Roma living in Rancitelli among local politicians:

> Rancitelli Roma are people outside of the rules, and forced to live in conditions that belong to the civil [majority] society; for example, living in houses. […] They are dirty, they keep music at a loud volume, they have arrogant ways of behaving and are often angry, they are involved in criminal activities, and therefore the police search their house.[9]

The same politician articulated his own view on the roots of the problem:

> Racism is not the problem. The problems are some attitudes that some Roma have that don't get accepted by the population. Consequently, Roma are homogenized and directly identified with those attitudes. Thus, this is bad also for those normal [Romani] persons, who do not commit crime, who are educated, and so on […] Since it is impossible to find a living together, politics should find the ways towards social integration, because [referring to Rancitelli] *that neighbourhood is an ethnic bomb!* And it could explode at any given moment.

Here again, as was the case of the Urban II programme's description of Pescarian Roma, and of Adriano's views of Rancitelli, according to local politicians responsibility for Roma's social exclusion lies with Roma themselves. Politicians' representations of Rancitelli depict an urban condition of permanent tensions between, on the one hand, social deviance, exclusively identified in Roma's illegal and often criminal behaviours, and on the other, a non-Romani local society in which citizens and institutions do what they can to contain a social disorder entirely deriving from Roma. In order to further delve into the ways in which Rancitelli has been represented and governed over previous decades, it is important to look at the local media discourse. According to local politicians, Rancitelli Roma are generally deviant subjects, who are responsible for their own condition, which is the cause of tensions with non-Roma.

Local media discourse: a striking symbiosis

From the previous analyses of Urban II, police actions and strategies, and local politicians' representations, it emerges that in all cases Rancitelli is portrayed as ecologically and socially *decayed*, and governed only through infrastructural and 'containment' measures, the former enacted by Urban II managers, the latter by the police. No other local authority is active in the neighbourhood, and the only other local actors producing a discourse on Rancitelli and Roma are local media. The local media discourse is a technology serving the function of *specifying* Roma and Rancitelli, articulating a strikingly perfect juxtaposition between the two that rests solely on social deviance. This explains, to a large extent, the condition of possibility for territorial stigmatization to become rooted in town. I conducted two thematic analysis, one on the ways in which Rancitelli is portrayed in the most locally read news website, *Prima da Noi*,[10] and the other on the representation of Roma from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s in the two most locally read newspaper, *Il Messaggero* and *Il Centro*.

From October 2005, when the website *Prima da Noi* was set up, to May 2012, there were 93 articles mentioning the neighbourhood, within which I detected five main themes. 'Handcuffing' was the most widespread theme, occurring in 41% of the articles; the second was that of 'Drugs and drug dealing', occurring in 30% of the articles; the third theme was that of 'Nomads/Roma', occurring in 17% of the articles; the fourth, 'Police blitz/raids', occurred in 6% of the articles, and the fifth, 'Robbery', also occurred in 6% of the articles. The image of Rancitelli that the local media produce is one of social deviance. Handcuffing regularly

occurs, due to drug-related crimes, which are often committed by 'nomads/Roma'. The juxtaposition between Rancitelli, criminality and 'nomads'/'Roma' can be said to be related to the neoliberal governance over Rancitelli in the last 35 years.

The second analysis showed that the territorial dimension of local press discourse on Roma has progressively narrowed down to Rancitelli. From the mid-to the late 1990s, such discourse was related to two main geographical areas, namely Rancitelli and the rest of the Pescarian province. The distribution of the actors involved in that discourse followed a very clear order. In Rancitelli, the police and the inhabitants played the two major roles, followed by civil society groups and association; on the other hand, in the rest of the Pescarian province civil society associations were the only protagonists. Finally, in the early 2000s local media discourse on Roma, the juxtaposition between Rancitelli, criminality and 'nomads' was established (see also Picker, 2010: 220-221).

Media representations seem to be in line with local politicians' ones, depicting a deviant population living in a neighbourhood that requires major police enforcement to be governed. They also highlight the striking symbiosis between the 'territorial' and the 'tribal' stigma, meaning between 'decay' (*degrado*) – overwhelmingly mentioning criminality, and the array of negative labels that non-Roma usually attach to Romani Pescarians. Having accounted for politicians and media representations' of Rancitelli and its Roma, I now turn to discussing the last two technologies of the urban governance apparatus, namely urban Roma stigma and surreptitious gazing.

Urban Roma stigma

Urban Roma stigma, which, as I discussed in the first section, can be seen as an instance of Goffman's (1963: 4) 'tribal stigma', is a technology serving the function of *specifying*, consists of one stigmatizing expression and three main stigmatizing devices for identification. The main stigmatizing expression used for identifying Roma in Pescara is '*pigri*', which, coming from the Latin '*pingus*', namely 'fat' or 'heavy', in Italian literally means 'the lazy ones'. However, in town this word is attached to a different set of meanings, ranging from social inappropriateness to social deviance. For example, a person driving a convertible listening to high-volume disco music is considered a *pigro* (feminine *pigra*), as is a man or a group of people (including women) walking down a street dressed in dark leather clothes with big golden necklaces. Yet, also a person involved in robbery or other similar illegal actions is considered to be a *pigro/a*. Therefore, this expression does not seem to come from the Italian '*pigro*'. Rather, the origins of the expression seem to be Spanish, having the everyday function of social control. In Spanish the word '*picaro*' means 'type of cunning person, belonging to lower social strata, who lives from trickery and similar actions'.[11] Rather than addressing Roma's allegedly laziness, *pigri* refers to a more comprehensive domain of borderline social and legal actions. The use of *pigri* is widespread in urban life, and it is usually coupled with three main devices of stigmatization, namely (1) reference to clothing, (2) social uses of surnames, and (3) skin colour.

In the eyes of non-Romani Pescarians, Pescarian Roma generally wear several earrings and may have a peculiar haircut. This emerges far more often with regards to women, wearing traditional long skirts and veils, than men. In this respect Romani women are considered to be more easily recognizable than Romani men in public spaces. In 2008 Carlo, a 40-year-old non-Romani resident of Rancitelli, explained to me the extent to which a person's outfit was a rooted symbolic device for identification:

> Romani women wear long dresses, the classic female dress is a long one, with much gold on it, bracelets and so on, [...] They have their own way of dressing, finally. Yet a little part of them [of Roma, i.e. Romani women and men] has adjusted to the others [non-Roma] [...] and we call them '*svestiti*' [lit. the undressed ones]. We say 'she has undressed', meaning she gradually took distance from her own traditions, and now she wears normal clothes as a normal citizen. Yet the majority of them still wear long dresses.

Svestiti might be seen as an additional stigmatizing expression, but I witnessed it in no other encounter. However, what emerges from Carlo's description is that clothing is seen as a 'bodily extension that cannot be removed without transforming one's lived

sense of embodiment […] Clothing through habituation is no longer seen as an object apart from the body, but comes to form an integrated part of one's body schema' (Orega and Arcoff, 2009: 78). What gives authority to this interpretation of clothing as a clear marker relating to body are Carlo's views about Roma as a group:

> These people [Roma] now live here, and it has been like this for years. They settled down in Pescara. Due to this fact, they have remained traditional exclusively as *stock*, as *race* [*come ceppo, come razza*]; also in the uses of their traditions and in the language they speak. Traditional Roma were a group that used to move from place to place.

During fieldwork, one of the most prominent everyday discourses on Roma was exactly Carlo's historical narration articulating rigid dichotomies, such as lost authenticity versus contemporary impurity. The second most widely widespread device of identification was surname. In summer 2011, while talking to Mario, a Romani man, age 39, living in Rancitelli, he explained to me why he was unemployed: 'It's now been two years since I asked the municipality to buy a space for opening my shop. However, as soon as they heard my surname […], they refused to sell me the space'. In Pescara surnames are one of the most powerful devices of identification of Roma in media accounts as well as in everyday knowledge. On another occasion, while talking to a social worker, she confided to me:

> Only from the surname you cannot one hundred per cent be sure whether someone is Roma or not. This has an exception, namely the 'historical' surnames such as Rini, Giorelli, Ranieri.[12] There are many surnames that you would never associate with Roma, but we cannot be sure about how to decide whether someone is Roma or not.[13]

The third stigmatizing device of identification in everyday life is skin colour. While talking with a social worker working with children in Rancitelli, she was explaining me that 'the ways to know whether a person is Rom is the surname, because, anyway, children's skin is anyway *white, very white*'. As may be noted, the three stigmatizing devices of identification outlined above – reference to clothing, social uses of surnames and skin colour – revolve around the idea of ancestry. Since clothing is part of a hereditary condition of being 'nomad', and surnames and skin colour are easily understandable as marking the biological boundaries of kinship, the domain within which everyday Roma stigma was articulated was that of racialization. This phenomenon, together with the stigmatizing expressions *pigri* and *nomadi*, seems to be able to keep the acceptable social order in Rancitelli. However, there is an additional technology providing an even stronger basis to the architecture of control over Rancitelli – a dynamic of surreptitious gazing.

Surreptitious gazing in Rancitelli

Although this technology has the main function of *controlling* Roma in Rancitelli, its articulation is more complex, as gazing is not a one-way process targeting Roma, but, as I will show, a multidirectional one. In summer 2008 Renzo, a 50-year-old Rancitelli resident, was a wholesale trader. One afternoon, while we were standing in one of the neighbourhood's main streets, talking about the local association I was volunteering in, he pointed at a car which was parked some 20 meters from us, and told me, 'You see there, that car? Those are policemen in plain clothes. Everyone knows they are policemen, and they know that everyone knows. They stay there hours and hours waiting'. 'What for?', I asked. He replied:

> For drug pushers. They wait for those who are not living in Rancitelli and thus cannot recognize them. This is our everyday life here. And you know, people know, everyone knows here that *Zingari* are the problem, but nobody will ever tell you that… because people are worried about retaliation. Here it is hell (*è n'inferno*). Here you are lucky if you move out!

Renzo's words account for a diffused and pervasive sense, in the neighbourhood's public spaces, of collective suspicion and constant tension related to eye-contact games, appraising and sizing up. During a late summer afternoon I was sitting, chatting with a Romani family in a little park in the centre of the



Figure 1. The circular dynamic of the urban governance apparatus in Rancitelli.

neighbourhood. One of them pointed at a man walking nearby, telling me: 'Do you see that guy? He is a *Carabiniere* in plain clothes, you can see from the way he walks: very fast and not looking around at all!'. Both the gaze of my interlocutor and the *Carabiniere's* deceptive attitude were signs of a surreptitious control, which anyone could easily perceive in the neighbourhood. This continuous gazing dynamic makes it difficult to escape from social control in Rancitelli's public space. Indeed, as I showed in the previous sections, this feeling of being under control is provoked by a whole set of discourses, policies, attitudes and ideas that contribute to inform a functional urban governance apparatus that is able to keep social order in the 'decayed neighbourhood'.

Conclusion: linking the six technologies

Figure 1 sketches visually the urban governance apparatus' circular dynamic, including the six technologies allowing social order maintenance in Rancitelli. The three main technologies, namely (1) Public Policy (Urban II); (2) urban Roma stigma in Pescara; and (3) surreptitious gazing in Rancitelli, mutually reinforce each other thanks to the other three technologies. The link between public policy and surreptitious gazing is constituted by police enforcement in the neighbourhood; the connection between public policy and everyday stigma is constituted by local politicians' representations, constructing Roma as deviant subjects, due to their alleged ethnic traits; finally, the last connection, between urban Roma stigma in Pescara and surreptitious gazing in Rancitelli is established by the local media discourse on Rancitelli and on its Roma, allowing Pescara's 'tribal stigma', that is, Roma stigma, to remain unchallenged, and delimiting, in turn, the range of acceptable policy options. Hence, it also promotes and socially validates everyday stigma and 'surreptitious gazing'. Intersections between the three vectors occur constantly. For example, as I showed in the section on media analysis, police raids are one of the main topics of news about Rancitelli; in turn, local politicians' representations of

Roma reproduce, to a large extent, the media discourse, and by portraying the neighbourhood as a criminal area, they underline the necessity for continuous police enforcement.

Stemming from the entire discussion, it would not be easy to describe the process of social order maintenance in Rancitelli by reference to the classic notion of urban governance. Although recent reflections on urban governance pointed out that '[urban] governance is of course an ideal type, of which only variations exist in reality' (Vranken, 2008: 34), it would not be easy to apply the classic notion of urban governance to the ways in which Rancitelli has been governed over the last three decades. The three key elements of urban governance, namely (1) coalitions of local authorities and private actors, such as private experts and other social groups, as the main drivers of governance; (2) temporary and ad hoc character of their actions; and (3) collective setting of goals, may only be found in the Urban II project. However, the project ended up lacking the initial funding, thus failing to put in practice what it planned on paper. Finally, entirely public actions, such as police actions, have been much more prominent than the Urban II project in the governance of Rancitelli. Over the last decade those actions have also been carried out at an increasing pace, thus it would not be accurate to argue for their ad-hoc character. Finally, goals do not seem to be set collectively, as the police have their own goal, while the Urban II project had a different once.

At the same time, I showed in my ethnographic account that the 'apparatus' *is* a form of urban governance, and evidence of this has a threefold ground. Firstly, its six constitutive technologies are horizontally organized; indeed, as I showed in the case of the Urban II project, there is a mutual interdependency between the project's definition of Roma as social problem and the urban Roma stigma; between the latter and the surreptitious gazing too, there is mutual interdependency. Secondly, although official coalitions of private and public actors occurred exclusively with regards to the Urban II project, informally they happen all the time. The police and the media do not seem to have different agendas; similarly, local authorities seem to share, privately, media discourses on Roma and the urban Roma stigma. Finally, although the goals are not formally set in a collective way, all actors contributing to governing the neighbourhood unanimously – although not publicly or consciously – envision the maintenance of social order as the main goal. Actors embrace different strategies, but they all converge in their effort to maintain social order in the neighbourhood. The 'urban governance apparatus' is a flexible and effective analytical tool that may allow researchers to dissect hidden and unofficial governance dynamics in Europe and beyond.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my colleagues at the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities for their useful comments on a first draft of the article. I am also thankful to Jon Fox, Silvia Pasquetti, Sandy Ross, Lili di Puppo and Gabriele Roccheggiani for their helpful critical remarks on later drafts. Finally I wish to thank Mike Raco for providing me with enlightening suggestions on how to improve the quality of the article.

Notes

1. In this regard, the work by Simon (2002) is an exception. However, the concept of 'ethnic minorities' in France 'does not actually mean anything' (Simon, 2002: 67), so it may well refer to second- and third-generation immigrants.
2. This emerges from recent studies of national-level governance of unrecognized minorities in Europe. See, for the case of Slovenia, Kuheli (2011) and for the case of Greece and Turkey, Grigoriadis (2008).
3. In summer 2008 I was renting a flat in the neighbourhood, carrying out interviews with local authorities and volunteering for a local association organizing street games for children in Rancitelli; in 2009 I dedicated several days to the meetings of a local association and to observing the relationships between Roma and non-Roma female residents in a Rancitelli supermarket. In July 2011 I visited the neighbourhood every day for two weeks, having regular conversations with my informants from the previous years and carrying out further interviews.
4. This historical discussion about district councils is based on two interviews I carried out in 2011 with the local politician who introduced them in the 1970s.
5. Carabinieri is a police force, which belongs to the Ministry of Defence. This is unlike the state police,

which, belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is a civic force; Carabinieri is a military force primarily having civic roles.

6. See the local newspaper article, 'La politica rom è fallita'. L'Opera Nomadi si arrende: 'Lasciamo Pescara'. Sotto accusa il Comune per i mancati interventi. ['Romani politics failed'. Opera Nomadi gives up. 'We abandon Pescara'. The municipality is accused of lacking interventions], *Il Centro*, 11 August 2002.
7. See the Urban II programme webpage: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/social_inclusion_fight_against_poverty/g24209_en.htm.
8. Personal communication with the police chief officer.
9. Interview with local politician, July 2008.
10. Before 2005 there was no online newspaper in Pescara. After 2005 online information became far more widely consumed than papers.
11. www.elmundo.es [For a discussion of picaro and the Euro-American figure of 'trickster', see Piasere (2011: 73-74)]
12. As in all other cases in this text, following an established practice in ethnography, I have replaced real names with pseudonyms.
13. Interview with social worker, July 2008.

References

Adams RG (2003) Stigma and the inappropriately stereotyped: the deadhead professional. *Sociation Today* 1(1). Available at: http://www.ncsociology.org/sociationtoday/deadhead.htm

Allen J and Cars G (2001) Multiculturalism and governing neighbourhoods. *Urban Studies* 38(12): 2195–2209.

Amin A (2002) Ethnicity and the multicultural city: living with diversity. *Environment and Planning A* 34(6): 959–980.

Bagnasco A and Le Gales P (eds) (2001) *La città nell'Europa contemporanea*. Bari: Liguori.

Brenner N (2004) *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Buck N, Gordon I, Harding A and Turok I (eds) (2005) *Changing Cities: Rethinking Urban Competitiveness, Cohesion and Governance*. London: Palgrave.

Città di and Pescara (2002) *"Urban II PE". Complemento di programma*. Available at: http://www.comune.pescara.it/satelliti/urban2/index.htm

Città di and Pescara (2006) "Urban II PE". Programma operativo. Approvato con decisione della C.E.C Municipal document C' (2006)7153. Municipal document.

Città di and Pescara (2007) "Urban II PE". Complemento di programma. Municipal document.

Comune di Pescara (2007) Urban II. Relazione trimestrale di monitoraggio al 31/12/2007. Municipal document.

Council of Europe (1992) Charter for regional or minority languages. Approved in Strasburg on November 5, 1992. Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm

Davies JS (2002) The governance of urban regeneration. A critique of the 'governing without government' thesis. *Public Administration* 80(2): 301–322.

Foucault M (1980) The confession of the flesh. In: Gordon C (ed.) *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault*. New York: Pantheon Books, pp. 194–228.

Giersig N (2008) *Multilevel Urban Governance and the 'European City': Discussing Metropolitan Reforms in Stockholm and Helsinki*. Wiesbaden: Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschaften.

Glick Schiller N and *Çağlar* A (2009) Towards a comparative theory of locality in migration studies: Migrant incorporation and city scale. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35(2): 177–202.

Goffman I (1963) *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall.

Governa F (2010) Competitiveness and cohesion: urban government and governance's strains of Italian cities. *Análise Social* 197(45): 663–683.

Grigoriadis M (2008) On the Europeanization of minority rights protection: comparing the cases of Greece and Turkey. *Mediterranean Politics* 13(1):23–41.

Guarnieri N and Dicati M (2005) *Minoranza etnica Rom: reciprocità e integrazione culturale*. Pescara: Media Edizioni.

Harvey D (1979) From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler Series B: Human Geography* 71(1): 3–17.

Il Pescara (2011) Pescara: militari in città dal 1 agosto fino alla fine del 2011. Available at http://www.ilpescara.it/cronaca/pescara-militari-in-citta-2011.html

Imrie R and Raco M (1999) How new is the new local governance? Lessons from the United Kingdom. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 24(1): 45–63.

Jessop B (2002) Liberalism, neoliberalism, and urban governance: a state–theoretical perspective. *Antipode* 34(3): 452–472.

Kuheli S (2011) The rise of xenophobic nationalism in Europe: a case of Slovenia. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44(4): 271–282.

Lazaridis G and Koumandraki M (2001) Deconstructing naturalism: the racialization of ethnic minorities in Greece. In: King R (ed.) *The Mediterranean Passage: Migration and New Cultural Encounters in Southern Europe*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp. 279–301.

Leach S (1996) Conclusion: scenarios for change. In: Leach S and David H (eds) *Enabling or Disabling Local Government: Choices for the Future*. London: Open University Press, pp. 158–172.

Le Galès P (2002) *European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maneri M (2010) Media discourse on immigration. The translation of control practices into the language we live by. In: Palidda S (ed.) *Racial Criminalization of Migrants in the 21st Century*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 77–94.

Manna F (1996) Rom abruzzesi: nomadi o sedentari? In: Piasere L (ed.) *Italia Romani*, vol. 1. Rome: CISU, pp. 43–58.

Mingione E and Nuvolati G (2003) Urban development Programmes in Italy. National institutional innovation and European programmes. In: Decker P, Vranken J, Beaumont J, et al. (eds) *On the Origins of Urban Development Programmes in Nine European Countries*. Antwerpen: Garant Publishers, pp. 101–118.

Molinari A and Sabatini D. (1996) Pescara: il rifiuto della convivenza. In: Brunello P (ed.) *L'urbanistica del disprezzo. Campi nomadi e società italiana*. Rome: Manifestolibri, pp. 216–226.

Orega M and Arcoff L (2009) *Constructing the Nation: A Race and Nationalism Reader*. New York: SUNY Press.

Osbourne T and Rose N (1999) Governing cities: notes on the spatialisation of virtue. *Environment and Planning D: Society & Space* 17: 737–760.

Pescara Vicina (2004) In un questionario la parola ai cittadini della circoscrizione di 'Villa del Fuoco'. December, 5: 21.

Pescara Vicina (2005) Anzitutto le abitazioni. May-June, 7: 21.

Piasere L (2011) Horror Infiniti. Die Zigeuner als Europas Trickster. *Behemoth*. *A Journal on Civilisation* 4(1): 57–85.

Picker G (2010) Nomads' Land? Political Cultures and Nationalist Stances vis-à-vis Roma in Italy. In: Rovid M, and Stewart M (eds) *Multidisciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies*. Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 211–227.

Picker G (2011) Welcome 'in'. Left-wing Tuscany and Romani migrants (1988-2007). *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 16(5): 607–620.

Picker G (2013) *'Ţiganu-i ţigan'*. Verbal icons and urban marginality in a post-socialist European city. *Civilisations. Revue internationale d'anthropologie et de sciences humaines* 61(2).

Rabinow P (2003) *Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment*. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Seixas J and Albet i and Mas A (2010) Urban governance in the South of Europe: cultural identities and global dilemmas. *Análise Social* 45(197): 771–787.

Simon P (2002) When de-segregation produces stigmatization. Ethnic minorities and urban policies in France. In: Martinello M and Piquard B (eds) *Diversity and the City*. Bilbao: University of Deusto, pp. 61–94.

Theodore N and Peck J (2012) Framing neoliberal urbanism: translating 'commonsense' urban policy across the OECD zone. *European Urban and Regional Studies* 19(1): 20–41.

Uitermark J and Duyendak JW (2008) Civilizing the city: populism and revanchist urbanism in Rotterdam. *Urban Studies* 45(7): 1485–1503.

Vaiou D and Stratigaki M (2008) From 'settlement' to 'integration': Informal practices and social services for women migrants in Athens. *European Journal of Urban and Regional Studies* 15(2): 119–32.

Van der Horst H and Ouwehand A (2012) 'Multicultural Planning' as a contested device in urban renewal and housing: reflections from the Netherlands. *Urban Studies* 49(4): 861–875.

Villoresi L (1988) Ma a Pescara vive un popolo di zingari con fissa dimora. *La Repubblica*, 22 January. Availble at: http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1988/01/22/ma-pescara-vive-un-popolo-di-zingari.html

Vranken J (2008) Competitiveness and cohesion. A Janus head? Some conceptual clarifications. In: Ache P, Andersen HT, Maloutas T, et al. (eds) *Cities between Competitiveness and Cohesion: Discourses, Realities and Implementation (GeoJournal)*. Springer Books.

Wacquant L (2007) Territorial stigmatization in the age of advanced marginality. *Thesis Eleven* 91(1): 66–77.

Wacquant L (2008) The militarization of urban marginality: lessons from the Brazilian metropolis. *International Political Sociology* 2(1): 56–74.